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1. INTRODUCTION
[Vol. 98:611
I wonder how many of the people reading this essay expect to see
a satisfactory system of international law in their lifetimes. By satisfac-
tory I don't mean perfect; domestic law is certainly not perfect in
either its content or its methods of enforcement. Satisfactory, in the
context of international law, means well articulated and generally ac-
cepted norms that are more or less fair, are usually obeyed and are
supported by the international community when violated. For a system
of international law to be satisfactory it must be substantively accept-
able, legitimate in its derivation, and reasonably effective.
There are, notoriously, two points of view on international law.
Skeptics claim that the term "international law" is an oxymoron - like
military music, legal ethics, British cuisine or (perhaps) academic liter-
ature. I They claim that without a centralized system of enforcement,
nothing approaching law can exist. The international law enthusiasts, in
contrast, see a glass half full rather than a glass half empty.2 The in-
ternational lawyers claim that actually there is a great deal of interna-
tional law currently in place and that its norms are generally, if quiet-
ly, observed. As Louis Henkin puts it, "The lawyer may see what law
there is and what law does; the critic may see only what law there is
not and what law has not achieved."3 But from neither point of view
is international law already as fully developed as domestic law. Even
the most optimistic international lawyers would probably not insist that
there already exists an optimal - or even a satisfactory - level of
norm observance, although most of them are too concerned with show-
ing what international law can do to be interested in making conces-
sions about what it can't. Whether the glass is half full or half empty,
1. See, e.g., JOEL ROSENTIIAL, E1HICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A READER
(Joel Rosenthal ed., 1995) (noting the "allegedly oxymoronic" nature of the phrase
"international ethics" in the book's introduction: Ethics through the Cold War and After).
Other frequent inclusions on this list of oxymorons are insurance coverage and
American culture.
2. For a well-known development of this point, see generally LOUIS HENKIN, How
NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979) (especially chapter 3).
3. Id. at 9.
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the point remains that no one claims that it is entirely full, or even as
full as we would like it to be.
If the current state of international law is less than satisfactory,
what should be said about international justice? Even those who are
among the most optimistic about international law would probably not
claim that international justice prevails. As with international law,
moreover, international justice has those who doubt that it even makes
sense as something to aim for. Justice, some think, exists only within
societies; it, is for a community to aspire to internally. Even some of
our most prominent theorists of domestic justice, such as John Rawls,
draw the line at applying their arguments to the international situa-
tion.4 If we add the common pessimism about international law to the
general gloom about the possibility of international justice we come out
with a fairly poor prognosis for the topic of this essay: international
justice through international law.
There is, of course, a tradition of aspirational writing about what
international law might in theory achieve for international justice. This
tradition generates blueprints for world government, world law enforce-
ment, and (eventually) world justice.s It is a respectable tradition, al-
though sometimes depressingly millennial, serving more to remind us
of how far we would have to go than to inspire us onward. I have no
intention of joining these architects of the future. The objective here is
diagnosis, not design. The question here is why international law can't
get more done; what is it good at and what is it not. In particular, I
am interested in identifying its capabilities at achieving international
justice.
4. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 377-82 (1971); John Rawls, The Law of
Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Stephen Shute, & Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
Other philosophers who have found Rawls' logic generally persuasive on domestic
matters have argued that if applied consistently it ought to be extended to international af-
fairs. See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989); CHARLES BEITZ, POLmCAL
THEoRY AND IN1ERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979).
5. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, To PERPEIUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH
(1795), reprinted i~ PERPEIUAL PEACE AND OTIIER ESSAYS (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983).
See generally HIDEMI SUGANAMI, THE DOMESTIC ANALOGY AND WORLD ORDER PROPOSALS
(1989) (especially chapter 9).
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 614 1995-1996
614 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:611
The fIrst pmt of this essay deals with the variety of things that
international law might try to do, and, in particular, with the various
forms of international justice that it might seek to implement. There
are many things that we might want from international law, and some
of these have to do with justice, while others do not. Of those that
deal with justice, a variety of different justice-based ideals are possible.
I start therefore by asking which of these objectives we can expect
international law,. as it currently stands, to accomplish. International
law has certain institutional tools, but not as many as we might like. It
is better situated to promote certain aspirations than others. If we want
to be able to promote those others, then we must be thinking about
how to strengthen its institutional design in particular ways.
The second part of this essay explores the question of what differ-
ence it makes tha.t international law has only developed the capacity to
do some of the things that we might want it to. SpecifIcally, I want to
address the possibility that international law's inability to achieve cer-
tain kinds of justice interferes with its ability to achieve certain other,
nonjustice based, objectives. International law takes the status quo for
granted as the appropriate point of departure. It asks "Where do we go
from here?" and tries to make things better for the future. International
justice, in contrast, does not privilege the status quo in this way. Its
point of departure is an ideal (although which ideal it chooses will
depend on which vision of justice it incorporates, and there is more
than one). If people care about justice then they act in ways that un-
dermine the possibility of achieving other international objectives such
as peace, cooperation, and mutual security. Or at least, that is the pos-
sibility I wish to consider.
The glass, in other words, is both half full and half empty at the
same time. The optimists and their critics are both right. International
law is indeed unsatisfactory, and far from optimally constructed to
achieving international justice. But there are also things that it is,
comparatively speaking, fairly good at. To understand the difference
between its capabilities and its incapacities is the fIrst step in enlarging
the former and eliminating the latter. It is extremely important that we
try to identify which things are which, rather than rely on overly broad
generalizations about it either being effective or ineffective in its en-
tirety. It is with this identifIcation that we must start, and from there
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we can go on to ask what if anything can be done to make interna-
tional law more effective as a whole.
II. OUR INTERNATIONAL ASPIRATIONS
What do we want out of international law? Some of our goals are
a product of our sense of international justice, while others are simply
questions of our general level of international well-being. The two
basic issues of general well-being concern international peace and the
promotion of international prosperity and cooperation through law. The
basic conceptions of international justice include retributive justice,
corrective justice, and distributive justice.
A. Peace and Prosperity
It hardly needs to be stated that two of our most important inter-
national aspirations are peace and prosperity. Peace, indeed, seems the
basic precondition for virtually all other international goods. The cost
of war must be measured not only in the lives and limbs that are lost
directly to armed conflict, but also in the economic devastation caused
by war and the psychological trauma suffered by those who witness it.
The costs of war last far into the future, as communities clear their
farms and fields of land mines, as children grow up without parents
who were killed, as disabled veterans slowly rebuild their lives while
living with the fear that their sacrifices will be forgotten, and as suc-
ceeding generations come to grips with hatreds of those their parents
fought against.
Close behind establishment of lasting peace is a second aspiration,
prosperity. It is second only in the sense that often it cannot come
until peace is achieved; it is not necessarily second in importance.
Certainly more people fmd their lives twisted by the effects of poverty
than by the direct effects of war. The effects include the health conse-
quences of malnutrition and preventable diseases, the psychological
costs of illiteracy, the physical burden of constant labor just to earn
enough to stay alive, and the general emotional sense of fatalism and
disempowerment that often accompanies the awareness that, through no
fault of one's own, one's life is destined to be very hard indeed.
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The connection between international law and peace seems more
direct than the connection between international law and prosperity.
International law is directly concerned with the prevention of interna-
tional aggression; with the inviolability of existing territorial borders.
In addition, many forms of physical violence against individual human
beings are prohibited by international human rights law, and some of
the cruelest excesses of war are banned by conventions dealing with
the proper conduct of armed conflict. The very notion of international
law seems to carry with it the idea that disputes can and should be
resolved through nonviolent means such as negotiation, diplomacy,
mediation, and international litigation.
International law, in contrast, seems less directly aimed at the
promotion of intemational prosperity. If all existing international norms
were honored from this day forward, there would be no guarantee that
international living standards would rise. But in addition to the practi-
cal fact that one cause of economic devastation would have been elimi-
nated - armed conflict - international law contributes to prosperity
in another way. International law is as much concerned with promotion
of international cooperation as with sanctioning antisocial conduct. Like
domestic law, international law facilitates the establishment of mutually
productive relations (commercial contracts, trade agreements, scientific
exchanges, and th(~ like) as well as imposing penalties for violations of
legal prohibitions. These cooperative arrangements are directly condu-
cive to the achievement of greater international prosperity.
While international peace and prosperity are undeniably goods,
they are not, for this reason, necessarily tied to international justice.
Indeed, they are obviously consistent with very great levels of injustice.
Peace might be the peace of colonialism or empire; a world dominated
by a single great power. Domestically, as well, this is the case. There
is more social unrest in some democracies than in some highly repres-
sive societies. Prosperity, in addition, is unevenly distributed around the
world. Increasing the world's wealth as a whole does not ensure a
basic minimum for all and this is true even where overall prosperity is
based on cooperation among nations. The terms of trade may be un-
even; strong nations may gain more from a cooperative scheme than
weaker ones.
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There is no reason to deny that, all other things considered, peace
and prosperity are proper goals of international law. But to understand
the connection between international law and international justice, we
must go beyond these undoubted goods. If there is more to internation-
al justice than peace and prosperity, what does international justice
distinctively involve? There are at least three different answers, one
focusing on retributive justice, one focusing on corrective justice, and
one focusing on distributive justice.
B. Three Forms of International Justice
Retributive justice, corrective justice, and distributive justice are
familiar concepts from domestic jurisprudence; the content of these
aspirations is substantially the same when international jurisprudence is
at issue. Retributive justice requires that violators of norms receive
penalties commensurate with their violations. Its connection with inter-
national law is obvious. Retribution is called for when norms are vio-
lated, and international law is one source of such norms. In internation-
al as in domestic society, punishment does not follow transgression
against all social norms (such as requirements of common courtesy, or
esthetic norms) but only those norms that have somehow been singled
out as having a distinct official character. International law is connect-
ed to retributive justice in that international law must specify which
behavior is prohibited, and what consequences follow from indulging in
it. To be worthy, international law must do both of these things in a
way consistent with basic morality.
Retributive justice has some similarities to the essentially instru-
mental objective of deterrence, but the differences are philosophically
significant. If the objective is deterrence, then punishment is merely a
means to the end of discouraging undesirable conduct in the future.
Deterrence is not a form of justice so much as an ingredient in the
promotion of international peace and cooperation. It contributes to
international peace because peace involves adherence to norms prohibit-
ing aggression. It contributes to international cooperation because coop-
eration requires that states comply with community norms even when
they impose a cost. Deterrence is important because without means to
encourage compliance states may violate norms when convenient, and
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so that other states will live in fear of such violations. As an
instrumental good., however, it is different from the justice based ideal
of retribution, according to which violators are subject to penalties
because that is morally appropriate regardless of any desirable conse-
quences that may follow.
Corrective justice is closely related to retributive justice. Corrective
justice requires that the wrongdoer compensate the victim for the
wrong that he or she has inflicted. Often, retributive justice and correc-
tive justice can both be served at the same time because if the wrong-
doer is required to compensate the victim this requirement of compen-
sation will itself be a penalty upon the wrongdoer. However, the two
need not be identical; it is possible to punish the wrongdoer in a way
that affords no bemefit to anyone or in a way that generates a benefit
to someone other than the victim. In domestic law, incarceration is an
example of the first and the imposition of fines an example 'of the
second. The purest embodiment of retribution in domestic law is crimi-
nal law. Tort law, in contrast, embodies both retribution and corrective
justice because a tort award puts the plaintiff in his or her initial posi-
tion while simultaneously imposing a penalty on the defendant.
The third typl~ of justice that is relevant to international affairs is
distributive justice. It offends our sense of fairness to see some
countries suffering abject poverty while others consume far more than
their share of the world's resources. Just exactly what is the cause of
this unbalanced distribution is open to dispute. Some cite the uneven
distribution of the;, world's natural resources: mineral wealth, fertile
agricultural land, fisheries, timber, and plentiful rainfall. Others point
to a history of colonial and neocolonial oppression, including the world
market system. Still others cite cultural differences, mismanagement,
official corruption, overpopulation, and environmental degradation as
presenting another possible set of answers.
Whether intemational redistribution is feasible and desirable is also
open to dispute. The practical difficulties of redistribution are evident,
but some would go further and claim that it is not desirable even as an
ideal. This position could be based either on a theory that the poor in
some sense deserve what they have; on the argument that even if they
do not deserve what they get it is better for them to be self-reliant; or
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on the premise that redistribution is only appropriate within a single
cooperative enterprise such as a particular nation state.6 Distributive
justice is probably more controversial than either retributive or correc-
tive justice. If the domestic model for retribution is criminal law, and
the model for corrective justice is tort law, then the best domestic
model for distributive justice would be entitlements supported by tax
revenues. (Domestic redistribution through taxation, of course, is con-
troversial just as international redistribution is, and for many of the
same reasons.)
In a certain sense, distributive justice is the mirror image of retrib-
utive justice, with corrective justice having aspects of both. Distributive
justice is motivated solely by the intended consequences for the benefi-
ciaries; while obviously the resources distributed to them have to come
from somewhere, the fact that they are taken from someone else's
pocket is incidental (indeed, perhaps, regrettable). With retributive
justice, in contrast, the motivation is solely the effect on the wrongdo-
er. What happens with any resources that he or she is deprived of is
incidental to the retributive purpose; they might be transferred to the
victim, but they might instead be forfeited to the state. Corrective
justice has aspects of both because ideally it places both the victim and
the wrongdoer back in their initial position; it penalizes the wrongdoer
while compensating the injured party.
III. OUR INTERNATIONAL TOOLS
What methods are at international law's disposal as it sets out to
advance these objectives? How does it attempt to provide peace, pro-
mote prosperity, and further the various sorts of international justice?
Criticisms that international law is ineffective are largely based on the
belief that its methods fall far short of those that are available to do-
mestic legal institutions. And it is true that some domestic tools are
relatively weak or are absent altogether in international law. The prob-
lem lies not with the articulation of norms to promote peace and pros-
perity, or to defme what justice requires. International law has as many
6. On the self-reliance issue, see Lea Brilmayer, Altruism in the International Envi-
ronment, _ CLEV. ST. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 1996).
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norms as one might need; what is lacking are ways to put them into
action. We can start with some of the things that international law is
relatively good at, and move progressively to those methods that are
relatively absent.7
A. Providing a Forum
International legal institutions are fairly capable when it comes to
provision of a forum for discussion. The United Nations comes imme-
diately to mind as a standing opportunity for countries of the world to
meet and discuss their differences; the existence of a standing forum
for discussion reduces the transaction costs of reaching international
consensus. Many of that organization's component bodies also fill this
function for specific issues - trade, communications, food and agricul-
ture, and so forth. We should not take this function for granted; free
exchange of opinions was not always possible. To cite just one exam-
ple of how international law has made it easier, safer, and more pro-
ductive to meet, the rules of diplomatic immunity have made it possi-
ble for countries to exchange ambassadors without fear of their being
maltreated. Such rules are rarely violated.
Provision of a forum is valuable in many different ways. Countries
often have important interests in common that cannot be adequately
identified and acknowledged without the opportunity for discussion. Of
course, interests are often not entirely congruent; but even where they
have a conflictual. element, face-to-face meetings may make those inter-
ests that they do have in common clear enough that the participants
fmd it worthwhile to set aside their differences. Sometimes the advan-
tage is in large part a psychological one; one's enemies may seem
more hostile and frightening when seen from a distance and meeting
7. There are interesting parallels between my breakdown into the different tools of
facilitation, pressure, and force, and the breakdown by Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal
into facilitative, productive, and enforcement regimes. See KENNEnI ABBOIT & DUNCAN
SNIDAL, MEsOINSTITIJ1lONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLmcs (forthcoming 1996). The similarity
is mainly limited, however, to the similarities between their first category and my first cate-
gory. Both their analysis and mine recognize the utility of formal international legal institu-
tions in bringing together states with congruent interests that would otherwise find it difficult
to reach agreement
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them may create a sense of common bonds of humanity. Negotiations
sometimes pick up sufficient inertia that, once started, their inner logic
provides its own motivations to settle. The fact that an international
institution will be available to monitor both sides' conduct after agree-
ment has been reached also encourages consensus.
Provision of a forum for discussion works largely through carrots,
not sticks. The object is to induce the parties to the negotiating table,
and from there to agreement, through the prospect of their own advan-
tage. For this reason, it should not be surprising that international law
has been most successful with problems that can" be solved through
arrangement of discussion and negotiation. International law need not
be backed by force when the parties' needs are overlapping - when
there is some state of affairs that would make them both better off. In
such circumstances, international law has only to take advantage of the
incentives that already exist in the parties' situations.
For all of these reasons, it is commonplace that the first step in
resolving differences is often simply to meet with one's opponents to
clarify the common interests that exist and to narrow as much as possi-
ble the range of disagreement. There is no doubt that the progress that
has been made in many current conflicts (the mideast peace talks come
immediately to mind) started with simply bringing the parties to the
bargaining table. Whether this is done bilaterally or through multilateral
international institutions, this process is facilitated enormously by inter-
national legal process and the diplomatic processes that the legal rules
make possible. Provision of a forum is an important element of the
international legal system's toolkit.
B. Pressure
International legal institutions are at their strongest and most effec-
tive where there is room for Pareto improvement; where there is some
state of affairs that will make both of the parties better off.8 As to
8. There are sometimes situations where one of the parties will be made better off
but the other will not In such cases, it may still be possible to "logroII" if the gain to one
party more than offsets the loss to the other. This is because the parties may be able to
link the issue in question to another one where the other party will be the one receiving the
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these, provision of a forum for discussion may be enough. International
law, famously, lacks its own "muscle"; its own ability to force the
parties to do something that they don't want to do. But where the
possibility of gains from trade provides its own pull, then muscle for
pushing may not be necessary. The problem is that not all cases of
conflict may fit this mold. This solution only works where it is possi-
ble to make both sides better off, and there may be cases in which
obeying a legal norm will make one of the parties to a dispute genu-
inely worse off.
The second most widely available international legal strategy is
application of pressure. Pressure also works through incentives, but
they are negative ones.9 By either imposing costs on one of the par-
ties, or by threatening to do so, other countries can create a state of
affairs in which~ relatively speaking, compliance with international
standards will appear attractive. The means for doing this are varied.
Sanctions can include trade boycotts; withdrawing ambassadors; ban-
ning a violator from participation in international sports, scientific, or
cultural activities; refusing to sign an unrelated agreement that the
violator wants; and various other signs of international disapproval.
Absent such sanctions, the violator would [md its contemplated course
of action more enticing than adherence to the norm; but when the costs
of the sanctions are counted in, its preference ordering changes.
This strategy is generally less feasible for the international legal
system than for domestic legal systems because it is costly to member
states, and therefore they will not apply these sanctions unless they feel
that there is a good reason to. 10 It is often not easy to obtain or coor-
benefit By linking issues in this way it becomes possible to make both parties better off.
9. In theory, it is possible for the international community to give nations positive
incentives to comply with their international obligations. The main problem with employing
this strategy too frequently is that it encoumges states to footdmg, and to decline to fulfill
obligations unless rewards are offered. This creates perverse incentives, because it rewards
expressions of unwillingness to carry out one's obligations, when the whole point of an
obligation is that it should be fulfilled even without any side payments.
10. As Abe and Antonia Handler Chayes put it:
The deficiencies of sanctions for treaty enforcement are related to their costs and
legitimacy. The costs of military sanctions are measured in lives, a price contempo-
mry publics seem disinclined to pay except for the most urgent objectives, clearly
related to primary national interests. The costs of economic sanctions are also high,
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dinate their cooperation. The activities that must be foregone in order
to put pressure on recalcitrant nations are often ones that would have
been highly beneficial to the other members of the community. Trade
boycotts are an obvious example; since the reason that countries engage
in the trade they do is for their mutual benefit, giving up trading op-
portunities that they would otherwise have taken advantage of is costly.
Trade sanctions during both the Persian Gulf War and the Balkan con-
flict have been very costly for neighboring states. In addition, each
state that observes the official boycott must live with the fear that it is
accepting these costs while others cheat. Countries worry, then, that
they will suffer in adhering to the boycott while the boycott never
becomes effective because others break rank.
Thus, if we were to rank international legal methods in terms of
how easy they will be to employ, and how likely they are to be avail-
able, we would have to put simple facilitation of mutually beneficial
exchanges first, and deterrence or sanctioning of antisocial behavior
through threats or the imposition of costs second. Both of these meth-
ods are more likely to be available, however, than a third method,
direct force designed to compel obedience to international law or to
seize resources that the violator is not entitled to retain. This method
can be illustrated by reference to one of the few recent examples in
which it was employed: the Persian Gulf War. II
not only for the state against which they are directed, where sanctions fall" mainly
on the weakest and most vulnerable, but also for the sanctioning states. When
economic sanctions are used, they tend to be leaky. Results are slow and not par-
ticularly conducive to changing behavior. The most important cost, however, is less
obvious. It is the serious political investment required to mobilize and maintain a
concerted military or economic effort over time in a system without any recognized
or acknowledged hierarchically superior authority.
ABE & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNlY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 2, on file with author).
11. The international occupations of Haiti and Somalia also had elements of this strate-
gy. However, these cases were different because in the former the occupation was acceded
to by the regime in power (albeit under pressure) and in the latter there was no effective
government in power. Of course, in Somalia, another difference was that the occupation was
not a response to violations of international law but an effort to alleviate a major humanitar-
ian crisis.
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 624 1995-1996
624 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:611
C. Direct Use of Force
In the Persian Gulf War, the American led coalition (acting with
the authorization of the United Nations) attempted fIrst to use indirect
methods to induce Iraq to retreat from Kuwait. These methods included
negotiations, diplomacy, and trade boycotts. Once the coalition decided
that none of these inducements were likely to prove successful, they
faced the issue squarely and decided to invade. What the coalition had
been unable to induce the Iraqi government to do through pressure, it
was able to force the Iraqi government to do through direct military
means.
In domestic law, of course, most governments possess fairly ample
(if not perfect) power to directly compel individuals to obey society's
norms. If it wants to prevent an individual from doing something, a
government can seize that person and put him or her into jail; and it
has the power, as well, to seize property to satisfy a judgment. What
passes for pressure in the domestic context, moreover, is often strongly
influenced by the fact that direct force is available. When a court en-
ters a judgment against a defendant, its judgment will typically have
the effect that the defendant will carry out the judgment rather than
risk the consequences. If the defendant does not, then courts have ways
of directly exercising control over the assets; these include garnishment
and attachment, as well as direct transfer of title to land. The court
need not use force because the losing party can see what will happen
if he or she does not cooperate. Direct force is involved but it remains
in the background; compliance appears voluntary but only because
noncompliance is recognized as futile.
When skeptics claim that international legal institutions have little
power, what they typically point to is inability to directly enforce inter-
national decisions. If a country were to ignore a World Court decision,
for example, there would be no international analog to seizure or at-
tachment. What occurred in the Persian Gulf War was quite exception-
al, and attributable mainly to the great importance attached to Kuwait's
oil resources. Thus, it is possible to argue that international law has
little weight beca.use it is not backed by force. It is almost always
possible for a tmly uncooperative violator to persist in thumbing its
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nose at the world community, so long as it is prepared to pay the
pnce.
Some of the reasons that direct action is rarely employed have to
do with the self-interested disinclination of other states to take on a
violator directly; and some have to do with the structure of the interna-
tional legal system itself. Other states' disinclination to employ direct
methods have mainly to do with the risks they face if they engage in
direct confrontation. The risks are especially high if military methods
are considered. Reflect on the international community's consistent
reaction to the current Balkan conflict; until quite recently, military
force was almost completely precluded. The preference of other nations
to use either mediation or incentives (positive or negative) as opposed
to intervening militarily is evident and takes no great sophistication to
understand. Military involvement is not only expensive, but also risky
to the lives of one's nationals. In the Balkans, bombing was undertak-
en only when it became embarrassingly clear that nothing else would
work and that the situation had become a general disgrace.
But this is not the only reason for the preference for indirect
methods. Direct force is discouraged by the very Charter of the United
Nations and by other principles of international law; this is so even
when the motivation is retaliation for a clear violation of international
law. Physical aggression is ruled out as a response to violations of
international law in almost all cases, the main exception having to do
with self-defense. It is perhaps ironic that by generally outlawing the
use of force, the international community has deprived itself of a very
forceful remedy for international wrongs. But this is not surprising, and
overall not a cause for great regret, considering that it would be hard
to build a system that allowed constituent states to use forceful meth-
ods if and only if they were being correctly employed as a remedy of
the international system. Opening the door to use of unilateral force,
even if in theory the opening is limited to response to violations of
international law, is potentially a very risky step.
It is for these reasons that the international legal system typically
works indirectly. Even once it is decided that some violation should be
met with strong resistance, and even once a political coalition is mobi-
lized to apply pressure, it is still generally politically and legally more
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feasible to act through creating incentives for the violator to decide to
change course. The status quo must be made sufficiently unpleasant
that the violator will decide, on its own, to step in line. Such indirec-
tion is clumsy and ineffective in comparison to directly forcing the
violator to comply. However, because the international legal system can
rarely muster the degree of forcefulness and consensus necessary to
intervene directly, indirect pressure is usually the best tool that is avail-
able.
IV. PEACE, PROSPERITY, AND JUSTICE: THE NECESSARY TOOLS
My thesis is that, given the relative weaknesses of the remedies
available in the international legal system, one should expect that it
would be better at maintaining peace and facilitating cooperation than
. at achieving justice; and that in particular, of the various forms of
justice, retribution is the easiest to pursue, with corrective justice and
distributive justice (respectively) presenting greater difficulties. The
logic behind this claim rests on the simple truisms that the ability to
achieve a goal depends on the extent to which that goal is in the mu-
tual interests of the parties, and, when the goal imposes costs on one
of the parties, this is more of an impediment when that party is a
strong state than a weak state. Because promotion of cooperation and
maintenance of peace involve, essentially, the identification of mutual
interests and the deterrence of violation of norms, they are easier to
achieve with the tools available to international law than the forms of
justice which require transferring assets from one state to another. The
proposed ranking might be sketched as follows, with difficulties in-









This claim is meant to be understood in a rather general way. It
refers to categories of problems, generally, and not necessarily to each
case specifically. There may be some problems of corrective justice
that are easier to address than some problems of deterrence. This is
likely to be true if one focuses on a minor corrective justice problem
and a major problem of deterrence. My argument is just that, all other
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things being equal, this general relationship holds between promoting
cooperation, maintaining order, and achieving justice. No pretense can
be made of mathematical precision at defining what is a major or
minor problem, or what exactly it means that "all things are otherwise
equal." But if the general thrust of the argument is sound, then one
would be led to predict what has, I think, proven to be the case: that
international law is better at preserving the status quo or moving the
parties to a mutually beneficial situation than at the transfer of resourc-
es that is sometimes necessary to further international justice.
A. Facilitation and Distributive Justice
We can start with the easiest part of the argument to make: the
two ends of the spectrum. There is likely to be little disagreement over
the fact that international law is relatively better at identifying and
promoting mutual interests than in redistributing wealth in a more
egalitarian way. Simply as an empirical matter, when one looks at
what international law has accomplished it has seemed to do very little
in terms of wealth redistribution, while most of its activities have been
directed at negotiation of agreements that the parties will adopt volun-
tarily and which, for that reason, can be assumed to be beneficial to
all involved. The reason should be obvious: agreements are positive
sum, and provide their own inducements to the parties, while transfer
payments are zero sum and are likely to be resisted by the state that is
supposed to supply the resources to be distributed.
It is clear that if international law is to be able to redistribute
wealth systematically, as opposed to simply doing so when rich nations
happen to feel like making voluntary contributions, or steering a great-
er share to poor nations when the pie itself is increasing, then it has to
have some kind of sanctioning power at hand. We have already point-
ed out that the tool typically used for wealth distribution in the domes-
tic context - the taxing authority's power to seize assets - is virtual-
ly completely lacking in the international context. This means that the
sole device for ensuring compliance with norms of redistribution is
application of pressure. But not only would distributive justice require
large amounts of pressure (because massive transfers of resources
would be involved) but also the pressure must be directed against pre-
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cisely those actors that are best situated to resist that pressure: the
wealthy and powerful. Distributive justice requires transfer of resources
from those with a great deal to those with very little. The former are
the least subject to pressure and the latter are the least able to exert it.
At the two opposite ends of the spectrum, then, we find that inter-
national law is fairly good at promoting mutually beneficial goals and
not at all capabI.;~ of providing any substantial amount of distributive
justice. My claim for the center of the spectrum is that deterrence is
easier to provide than retributive justice, and that retributive justice is
easier to provide than corrective justice. The reasons why are easy
enough to see when one keeps in mind what deterrence, retribution,
and correction consist of.
B. Deterrence, Retribution, and Correction
Deterrence involves application of pressure to discourage violation
of international norms. Retribution involves imposition of appropriate
penalties for violation of international law. And corrective justice in-
volves requiring 1he violator to compensate the victim. The reason that
deterrence is easier than retribution, which is in turn easier than correc-
tion, is simply that any system that is capable of mobilizing the pres-
sure to require the violator to compensate the victim has thereby im-
posed a penalty on him or her; and any system that is capable of mo-
bilizing the pressure to inflict a penalty upon the violator has thereby
imposed a deterrent. The capacity to effect corrective justice implies
the capacity to effect retributive justice, which in turn implies the ca-
pacity to deter. The reason is that deterrence is included within retribu-
tion, and retribution within correction. But the converse is not neces-
sarily the case. We might label these claim one and claim two, respec-
tively:
1. retribution implies deterrence (but not the converse)
2. correction implies retribution (but not the converse)
Consider first claim two, namely that the capacity to effect correc-
tive justice implies the capacity to effect retributive justice (but that the
converse is not true). Corrective justice means that the violator has
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been required to pay the victim enough to compensate him or her. The
very fact that the violator has been required to pay compensation is in
itself a penalty, even if the reason for the requirement is a compensa-
tory rather than a punitive one. Corrective justice requires two things
- compensation for the victim, and compensation from the violator -
and the latter of these essentially amounts to the imposition of a penal-
ty. The converse of this proposition is not, however, true. It is entirely
possible for a system to be capable of effecting retribution without
being capable of effecting compensation.
To see this, one need only look at domestic law. One of the rea-
sons that compensation is more difficult than retribution is that the
violator may not have sufficient assets to make amends for the conse-
quences of his or her activities. Yet the fact that it is impossible to
force compensation does not mean that retribution is impossible; for
the remedy imposed may not be a fmancial one (incarceration). All
corrective remedies are also retributive, but the opposite is not the
case. The same is as true in international as in domestic affairs. The
violator may not have the resources to make the victim whole; but
other measures may exist to penalize the violator, such as trade sanc-
tions, withdrawal of membership in international organizations, and the
like.
In the international situation, moreover, there is an additional diffi-
culty that stems from the fact that the amount of pressure that can be
marshalled is limited. It may be difficult to apply enough pressure to
force the violator to compensate the victim, because the amount of
pressure sufficient to deprive the violator of the net benefit of its vio-
lation may still not be sufficient to force it to return the benefits it has
received. If the net benefit of the violation is x, so that imposition of a
penalty of that size is adequate to deprive it of any gains from its
violation, a penalty of x may nonetheless not be sufficient to force it
to return its unjust gains. It may simply prefer to suffer the penalty in
silence. One important reason is that the violator would probably lose
face if it admitted that it violated international law; giving in signals
weakness to one's opponents both at home and abroad. 12 Because in-
12. Consider, for example, the unwillingness of Saddam Hussein to give in to interna-
tional sanctions. Inability to deal with pressure from the outside would send a message to
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ternational law must rely on indirect pressure rather than directly forc-
ing violators to comply, the violator that cares deeply about not com-
pensating the victim is in a strong position to resist.
If the amount of pressure that is applied is not effective to cause
the violator to give compensation, in addition, then all of the
international legal system's efforts are wasted from a corrective justice
point of view. The pain imposed on the violator is only a means to an
end, and if the emd of corrective justice to the victim is not achieved,
the effort was all for naught. The same cannot be said of retribution;
even if the amount of pressure imposed is insufficient to bring about
compensation, it will still function as a penalty. In particular, from a
retributive standpoint, the international legal system need not apply the
extra increment of pressure that would be required to motivate a state
to loose face. Corrective justice is an all or nothing matter while, retri-
bution is not. Either enough pressure is applied to force the violator to
give compensation, or the opposite is true.
Turning now to the fIrst claim - that the ability to punish entails
an ability to deter, but not the converse - similar reasoning applies.
The fIrst part of the fIrst claim is true because punishment in itself
acts as a deterrent; where a legal system is known to have the ability
to effect retribution, violations are less likely to occur. Just as correc-
tive justice contains within it the kernel of a retributive remedy, so
retribution contains nested within it a kernel of deterrence. This does
not mean that re1ribution and deterrence are philosophically equivalent.
Retribution views punishment as morally desirable in its own right,
while deterrence sees it as a means to an end. However, imposing a
penalty for retributive purposes also has the effect of deterring similar
conduct in the future.
The convers(~ is not, however, the case. It is not the case that a
system that has the capacity to deter has the capacity to effect punish-
ment. It is virtually a truism that it takes less to deter a violation than
to punish it once it has occurred. The main reason is that deterrence
requires only maintaining the status quo, and usually the status quo has
practical advantages on its side. For example, in deciding whether to
internal enemies of the regime that it was losing its grip on the political situation.
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commit a violation a state will both consider the expense involved in
engaging in the violation (e.g., military costs in the case of the inva-
sion of Kuwait) as well as discount the benefit by the less than total
probability of success.13
This reasoning suggests why it is that those who tout the advan-
tages of international law see the glass as half full while those who
dismiss international law see the glass as half empty. Some illegal
actions are deterred while others are not. The fact that some are de-
terred shows that international law has some teeth. The fact that some
are not shows that it is not perfect. Of course, in domestic law as
well, some violations are not deterred. But at least with regard to those
violations where the perpetrator is known, domestic law is able to
apply a remedy while international law is not. If one focuses on the
violations that are deterred, then, international law seems relatively
effective; but one might instead choose to focus on the fact that when
the decision is made to violate the law, it can be done without fear of
reversal by the international community.
Of the three - deterrence, retribution, and correction - deter-
rence, then, is the most feasible in a system characterized by scarce in-
stitutional resources. But deterrence is valuable because it makes possi-
ble the orderly pursuit of international peace and cooperation. Com-
bined with the fact that peace and cooperation are typically mutually
beneficial, the fact that deterrence is more generally available than the
13. The main exception to this truism is where the violator hopes to escape detection.
In such cases, a greater penalty may be required to deter violations than would ideally be
called for as a retributive matter, because the violator will discount the penalty by the likeli-
hood of being caught However, with regard to the question at hand, the possibility of evad-
ing detection is essentially a "wash" in the comparison between retribution and deterrence. If
the question is how much institutional strength is needed to achieve deterrence as opposed
to effecting retribution, the problem of undetected violations weighs in equally as against
both. One cannot deter violations that are an absolute secret, but one also cannot effect
retribution.
The international context is different from the domestic context because the key issue
is the ability to marshall pressure against a known violator. For one thing, most violations
of international law are much more public than violations of domestic law. In domestic law,
it is virtually always the case that either the occurrence of the violation or the identity of
the violator (or both) is designed to be kept secret In addition, international law is much
more sensitive than domestic law to problems of organizing sanctions against violations, for
all of the reasons discussed in the text
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various forms of justice supports my claim that international well-being
is easier to pursue than international justice.
V. JUSTICE AND THE STATUS QUO
The basic difficulty with the pursuit of international justice is that
it does not privilege the status quo the way that international law does.
We have already argued that international law is at its best when the
object is either to maintain the status quo or to move the status quo in
some direction that is preferable from the point of view of all parties.
This makes a certain amount of sense; for when there are limited tools
available, it is easiest to start at the point where one currently finds
oneself rather than insisting first on a radical rearrangement. But inter-
national justice searches for ideals, not practical solutions. It asks what
is the normativ<;:ly most defensible state of affairs, and there is no
particular reason to think that that is the current state of affairs (unless
one believes that by some invisible hand, the current distribution came
to mimic what justice would require anyway - a hard proposition to
defend).
International justice is redistributive in a way that other interna-
tional aspirations are not. This is most obviously true in the case of
distributive justice - indeed, the names suggest as much - but it is
also the case with corrective and retributive justice. With corrective
justice, the object is to take illgotten gains away from violators of
norms and use them to make the victims whole. With retributive jus-
tice, the object is to penalize the violator to the appropriate degree
(although what to do with any resources that are seized is left open).
All three forms of justice require us to compare the current state of
affairs to the proper state of affairs, and to take from some and give to
others so as to bring things as close as possible to the ideal.
Just as there is no reason to think that the ideal state of affairs is
identical to the status quo, there is no particular reason to think that
the ideal state of affairs (from the point of view of justice) is Pareto
superior to the status quo - that, in other words, it will make all
states better off. There are likely to be losers. Indeed, it is virtually
built in with at least two of the forms of justice that there be losers.
The whole point of retributive justice is that something be taken away
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from the state that violated international norms. And part of the point
of corrective justice is that the compensation given to the victim comes
from the violator. International justice, therefore, is swimming against
the tide. It requires international legal mechanisms that are not general-
ly available. It requires the ability to redistribute when what we pri-
marily have is the ability either to maintain the status quo or to move
it in a Pareto superior direction.
In domestic legal arrangements, we do not face such problems to
nearly as great a degree. The reason is that the potential use of force
makes it unnecessary to proceed by indirection, by creating incentives
for actors to themselves prefer the outcome that is right. This is
particularly true for distributive justice, for our tax system is backed by
the threat that if you do not pay your taxes and this is discovered,
your assets will be seized. In the analogous international setting, in
contrast, the wealthy country that chooses not to contribute to
international assistance schemes - or, for that matter, chooses not to
pay its United Nations dues - can do so if it is willing to put up
with the pressure that its defiance generates.14
So long as international law must try whenever possible to work
through the promotion of mutually beneficial solutions, it will be
relegated to' protection of the status quo and facilitation of Pareto supe-
rior improvements. Justice will be beyond its grasp. So long as its only
alternative is to apply pressure, thus inducing compliance, the interna-
tional legal system will fmd corrective and distributive justice singular-
ly difficult to achieve. It will fmd itself limited to incremental im-
provements to the well-being of all, with occasional forays into the
punishment of international criminals. We certainly should not, for this
reason, despise our international institutions. Promotion of peace and
cooperation is certainly an attractive objective, tethered to the status
quo though it may be. Yet, we must also ask ourselves whether these
limitations on the international legal system might have a corrosive ef-
fect even on the functions at which it is relatively capable. There are
reasons to be concerned that the inability to achieve justice (especially
14. On the unwillingness of the United States to pay its United Nations dues, see
Barbara Crossette, Even Its Allies Castigate U.S. Over Failure to Pay U.N. Dues, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct 3, 1995, at A3.
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corrective and distributive justice) might undermine promotion of sta-
bility, order, and mutually beneficial agreements. "No justice, no
peace," as they say. We turn to these questions in part two.
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PART TWO:
INTERNATIONAL LAW - ITS PAST AND ITS FUTURE
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a tension, in international law, between the past and the
future. It is exemplified by recent media coverage of the ongoing in-
vestigations of war crimes committed during the conflict in the former
1Yugoslavia.1 At the same time that a tribunal constituted by the Unit-
ed Nations was investigating and indicting several Serbian leaders for
the crime of inciting and committing outrageous human rights abuses,
other international leaders were conducting serious negotiations with
many of those same individuals over the fate of Bosnia JIerzegovina.
Obviously, it is hard to reach a settlement with individuals who mow
that they are likely to be convicted of human rights violations and
punished if they ever fall into the hands of the international communi-
ty. Should one, then, offer amnesty or pardon as a part of the settle-
ment? Moving ahead to peace seems to require one to tum a blind eye
to justice for past wrongs. But how can one bargain in good faith with
people who are likely guilty of the sorts of things with which these
individuals are charged? And how can one consider pardoning them?
If we were to phrase the problem in terms proposed in the first
part of this essay, we might say that international law is better situated
institutionally to move forward towards solutions that improve the
position of all of the participants than it is to correct the inequities or
injustices that exist. Its institutional mechanisms are pointed towards
the future while its equities are rooted in the past. International leaders,
1. Stephen Engelberg, Panel Seeks U.S. Pledge on Bosnia War Criminals, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1995, at AI. See also Roger Cohen, When the Price of Peace is Injustice,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1995, at D3 ("The position of a United Nations tribunal investigating
war crimes was clear: without justice, any peace will be tenuous and bound for collapse.
But American negotiators were more nuanced, for diplomacy by its nature is the enemy of
absolute judgments. The peace accord they seek would naturally be a forward-looking thing.
Judicial investigations look backward.").
The identical issue has arisen in many other contexts. See, e.g., John Ryle, An Afri-
can Nuremberg, THE NEW YORKER., Oct 2, 1995, at 50 ("Their former rulers are on trial
for the torture and murder of thousands but many Ethiopians are more concerned about the
present").
635
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intent on bringing about a compromise that will improve upon the
status quo for everyone, express frustration with national leaders who
(from the world community's point of view) selfishly and irrationally
refuse the bargains that the international community urges upon them.
Conversely, national leaders express anger at a world community that
sets up compromises on their behalf and then insists that these are
mutually beneficial. For national leaders compare proposed solutions to
what they feel that they deserve - to their ideal of justice - rather
than to the statu.s quo, and in comparison to what they see as their
entitlement, the compromises offer far too little. And their ideal of
justice is often grounded in their understanding of the past.
The inability to reconcile oneself with the status quo, coupled with
the knowledge that international institutions are simply not designed to
help obtain what one is entitled to, is a major source of international
violence today. International violence is seriously different from domes-
tic political violence.2 For domestic political violence is largely orient-
ed toward capturing existing mechanisms of the state and is therefore
largely forward-looking. The civil wars that we have seen in Liberia,
Somalia, and Afghanistan, and the violent repression of countries such
as Argentina and Haiti, have more to do with taking and holding polit-
ical power than with righting real or imagined past wrongs. Struggles
for control of an existing political institution typically are grounded in
beliefs about how politics should be organized in the future, with past
wrongs being offered solely as evidence to show that the government
currently in pow<::r is unlikely to be fair or competent.
2. For these purposes, I am lumping secessionist movements with the category of in-
ternational violence. The reason that international disputes typically depend on claims of his-
torical justice is that they involve demands against third parties, either citizens of foreign
nations (in the case 0 f the usual international dispute) or fellow citizens who are members
of a different national group. There must be a justification for depriving these individuals of
the resource in question, and typically such justifications are grounded in arguments of his-
torical entitlement In contrast, in civil wars it is thought to be an adequate justification for
throwing one government out simply that it is not wanted by some large percentage of the
population. Thus, intrastate challengers to existing governments do not feel a need to justify
their movements in quite the same way.
On the imporumce of historical claims to nationalist movements, see genemlly Lea
Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOlRE DAME L. REv. 7 (1996).
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There are exceptions; Rwanda is a mixed case, including both a
fight to control the country and revenge. It seems likely that the inten-
sity of the savagery is connected to the fact that both impulses are
implicated, rather than merely the former, for either one can generate
bloodshed enough. And there are occasions when international violence
is not genuinely motivated by a claim of corrective justice, although as
in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait it may be useful to invent one.3
What differentiates international from domestic violence is that
there is no institutional mechanism to seize. Whatever institutions of
political governance and law enforcement exist, they are decentralized
and therefore virtually impossible to gain control of. In the eyes of the
participants, international violence is not typically a fight for general
political control, but rather an effort to get what one is entitled to and
what one is unable to get because inadequate international justice
mechanisms exist to recognize one's claims. The fact that international
law is obviously not equipped to promote international justice is
therefore, itself, an incitement to international violence.
II. WHY PEOPLE FIGHT
One of the main reasons that people fight is that they believe that
they have been treated unjustly. Of course, this is not the only reason
people fight.4 They sometimes fight because they are paid to fight -
contract killers in the domestic setting and mercenaries in the
international setting are clear examples - and sometimes there are
3. There are, of course, some who are completely cynical about justice, such as the
leaders of the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs who deliberately stirred up ethnic hatred in
order to preserve their own prerogatives which were in danger of being lost after the fall of
communism in the former Yugoslavia. However, one of the things that this example shows
is precisely that in order to get people to fight you must provide them with a rationale for
fighting. Although the leaders of the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs were themselves quite cynical,
they operated by reawakening in the public at large a sense of corrective justice. Rarely do
the ordinary people who do most of the fighting have as cynical an attitude as the leaders
did in this case. Typically, a grievance or sense of historical mission is necessary in order
to mobilize the people who will bear the brunt of the war.
4. This is true both domestically and internationally, although as I have just suggested
the sense of justice is largely forward-looking in the domestic case and largely backward-
looking in the international case.
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mixed motives as when an individual fights for his or her own country
because the military is the best career available. Sometimes people
fight because they have been forced to, as where they are drafted. And
sometimes they fight because they see in it some naked self-advantage,
such as the opportunity to loot, or to rape, or to kill those against
whom one has a personal grudge. There are, clearly, many reasons to
fight.
But people who fight for gain (either a paycheck, a profession, or
a criminal opportunity) are, relatively speaking, easier to deal with than
people who fight for what they think is just. People who fight for gain
can be bought off. All you need to do is to provide them with resourc-
es to compensate: their lost opportunities; and the size of the bribe can
be reduced to reflect the fact that if they will settle for that bribe, they
will not run the risk of being killed. The key question is whether they
have done the best for themselves under the present situation; in this
sense they are pragmatic. They are not inclined to fight as underdogs
in situations where victory is quite unlikely.
People who fight for what they believe in are notoriously more
successful fighters than those who fight for gain. They are more will-
ing to take risks, more willing to invest their own talents and abilities,
and more willing to suffer hardship. Their loyalty is more unshakable.
People who fight for justice care less about being killed, because they
recognize a value in sacrifice. They do not care about public opinion,
except the publi(~ opinion of the group that shares their cause. And it
is not usually possible to buy off people who fight for justice without
providing them with at least a good portion of what it is that they feel
entitled to. Group leaders who show willingness to settle for less than. .
what the group sees as its entitlement risk being written off as "sell
outs."
In the international context, it is usually a particular view of cor-
rective justice that supplies the sense of grievance necessary to
motivate people to fight with passion. The inability to provide interna-
tional distributive justice is not as much of a threat to stability as the
inability to provide international corrective justice. The reason is that it
is far more difficult to fight for international distributive justice than
international corrective justice. Even if the participants are convinced
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that justice entitles them to a larger portion of the world's resources
(and as we have already noted, this sort of claim is highly controver-
sial in both the world at large and the philosophical community), orga-
nizing to obtain those resources is difficult and, in particular, it is
difficult to use violence to further those goals.
This is because even if there is a good claim to a greater share of
resources, that fact alone does not provide a strong claim against any
one particular resource. The poor are entitled to something; but exactly
what it might be is fungible, assuming only that it must be sufficiently
substantial to satisfy their claims. It is harder. to rally people around
the claim to "something" than to a particular thing that they feel they
have an historical right to (and quite possibly already a psychological
attachment, as well). In addition, by defInition, those who are fighting
for distributive justice are the poor and weak; their opponents are the
rich and strong. This fact in and of itself makes it harder to fight for
distributive than corrective justice, as to which the competing claimants
may be evenly matched.
In addition, distributive justice requires institutional mechanisms
for it to be optimally successful. In the domestic context, distribution is
carried out through a complicated system of taxation. Effective distri-
bution must be ongoing, as opposed to corrective justice, which can be
a one-shot deal. When one fights for distributive justice in domestic
society - as many revolutions have done - there is an institutional
mechanism to capture. Once one takes control of the state, one has the
leeway to build a system of distribution of property that nationalizes
industry and imposes land reform. There is no comparable institution
of government to seize in the international setting. There is no mecha-
nism that, once captured, can carry on redistributive activities as a day-
to-day matter.
There is an interesting analogy between this point and the argu-
ment made in part one of this essay about the international system's
reliance on pressure as a method of control. In a perfect legal system,
with good enforcement mechanisms, it is possible to carry out a legal
decision directly. If it is decided that some resource ought to be trans-
ferred from one claimant to another, the means exist to simply take
control of the resource and hand it to its rightful owner. Where control
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is incomplete, however, the ability to do this directly may not exist. In
such cases, the only way to influence the conduct of others is through
infliction of costs. The goal is to make things sufficiently costly that
the target of one's activity decides to comply. And so, I noted, the
international legal system (with its incomplete enforcement mecha-
nisms) works through the imposition of penalties. By making it more
costly to violate international law, the international legal system seeks
to induce the target to obey.
The same is true when an individual or group, as opposed to the
international legal system as a whole, seeks to get its way internation-
ally. Typically, the individual or group will not have the physical
means simply to seize what it wants; only a few powerful states have
the capacity to work their will directly, and they will only be willing
to exercise this JPower in exceptional cases. Thus, aggrieved groups
must attempt indirectly to influence their target's conduct. They must
make it sufficiently unpleasant that the target decides to relinquish
what it is that tile complaining party wants. While the international
legal system tends to do this through unpleasant but legally acceptable
methods - cond,~mnation, trade sanctions, and the like - individual
states and other groups and individuals fall back on the only means
available to them. Often, this means violence.
Whether it is the international community as a whole that is trying
to change the status quo or whether it is simply one of the participants
to the controversy with a particular self-interested point of view, it is
extremely difficult to bring about significant redistribution. The only
means available is pressure, and distributive justice requires that pres-
sure be brought to bear against the wealthy by the poor. There is no
international institution that can compare to domestic institutions in
their ability to transfer resources from one place to another and, in
particular, from the strong to the weak. Thus, international distributive
justice at the instance of the parties is as unlikely a proposition as
international distributive justice undertaken by the community as a whole.
Corrective jU51ice, then, is not only a threat to international peace
and order; it is likely to be the primary.threat. Of course, to say that
people often fight, and fight most intractably, for what they think is
just is not to say that they are necessarily right, either about the justice
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 641 1995-1996
1996] INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: PART II 641
of their cause or that the cause in question is worth fighting for. Nei-
ther does it mean that the methods that are employed are acceptable.
Those who fight are often wrong about matters of historical fact or the
moral reasoning that is founded on it. Sincerity is different from moral
rightness. But sincerity itself can matter even when the holders of a
belief are wrong about either the facts of the matter or the moral
conclusions that they draw.
International peace is very fragile. Peace is fragile, in part, because
people and their property are fragile. It is far easier to build a bomb
that will maim and kill than to put together the bodies, lives, and
families of the injured. Building dams and bridges, planting crops, and
constructing schools and homes is far more difficult and expensive than
blowing them up or laying mines. Thwarting international terrorism is
an expensive and iffy proposition. It only takes a few airline hijackings
to create the need for metal detectors and luggage searches; and these
must be put in place in every airport in the world to be effective. The
point is not that such precautions are not cost effective; in terms of the
lives they save, it is hard to doubt that they are. But while the costs
are commensurate with their benefits, they are nonetheless far greater
than the costs to those who make them necessary.
The fact that international law is relatively incapable of supplying
corrective justice, in this way, puts its efforts to further international
peace in jeopardy as well. Its ability to maintain order and channel
complaints through legal processes - to maintain a monopoly of pow-
er, in other words - are threatened by the incompleteness of what it
has to offer. One might think that if the international legal system is
incomplete, that it will simply supply what it can and leave any objec-
tives that it cannot provide to whatever means private parties find
available. But it is not possible to maintain order without a greater
ability to provide a comprehensive set of legal remedies, and in partic-
ular the remedy of corrective justice. For so long as peace is fragile,
and the only methods of achieving what one thinks is just is to fight,
international violence will be unavoidable.
In a sense, this appears to be nothing more than a restatement of
the familiar claim that self-help is to be expected, given that
international relations is a state of anarchy. It is a lack of effective
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legal and remedial institutions that accounts for international violence.
From this, it is typically argued that morality is absent from interna-
tional affairs. Yet my claim is different from that one in important
ways, in particular in the conclusions that it draws about international
morality. Because this is an important element of the analysis about
how international law must balance the claims of the future against the
demands of the past, it is where we should tum next.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL STATE OF ANARCHY
The familiar self-help argument about international relations being
a state of anarchy runs roughly as follows. International law is not
backed by force~ because there are no centralized institutions or inter-
national governance. Because of the absence of centralized enforcement
mechanisms, each nation must fend for itself. It is mistaken to expect
or insist that nations adhere to some sense of international morality, for
if they do they will have no assurance that other nations will recipro-
cate. Because each nation must be constantly on its guard to protect
against risks posed by its competitors, it cannot afford to attend to
such moral niceties as international law.
When one examines carefully the situations in which this sort of
argument is most persuasive, however, one fmds that what they have
in common suggests a rather different line of analysis.s For example,
consider the case of nuclear weapons. Many consider them to be cate-
gorically immoral. A skeptic might deny that it is morally
impermissible to develop (or, perhaps, to use) nuclear weapons because
there is no guarantee that if we abandon our nuclear weapons program
that other countries will do so as well. If our enemies have nuclear
weapons, they may be able to attack us successfully. Therefore (so the
argument goes) we should retain our nuclear weapons because they are
necessary for self-protection.
But this argument gains its appeal from the fact that our enemies
are not entitled to attack us, or in other words, that we are entitled to
5. See general(v Lea Brilmayer, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLmcAL MORALITY IN A
ONE SUPERPOWER WORLD (1994) (discussing the anarchy line of argument in chapter 2).
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territorial integrity and self-protection. Because they are not entitled to
attack us, and because there is no centralized enforcement mechanism
to prevent such an attack, we should retain all means of self-defense
against such a wrongful attack. The claim that we should not be criti-
cized for retaining nuclear weapons because we need them for self-
defense does not lead to the conclusion that we are entitled to use
them to grab territory from other states, or commit genocide against
ethnic groups that we are prejudiced against. At most it me"ans that we
are entitled to use nuclear weapons for those legitimate interests that
the international system ought to be protecting but that it cannot pro-
tect because it lacks centralized enforcement mechanisms.
So the real claim must be that because one's rights under some
particular norm are not adequately protected, one is entitled to use self-
help to protect those legitimate rights. Already, one can see that there
are important normative aspects to this claim both in theory and in
application. In theory, this claim raises normative issues because it is
in essence an argument to the effect that where legitimate interests are
at stake, otherwise impermissible methods may be used to protect those
legitimate interests. To some people, no doubt, this premise is entirely
clear. To persons who believe this, it is ridiculous to prohibit nuclear
weapons regardless of the consequences, even though the heavens may
fall. They mayor may not be correct about this. But what matters now
is that this is, itself, a moral argument. When people say that the ends
justify the means they are making a moral claim about the possibility
that the consequences might be more important than the morality of
the methods that are employed. Thus, even under the anarchy argu-
ment, moral argumentation remains important.
In practice, the anarchy claim also relies in important ways upon
normative thought. The reason is that it is at most convincing when
the ends are in fact legitimate. The argument about nuclear weapons is
only persuasive (if, indeed, it is persuasive at all) if they are employed
to morally acceptable use. It does not follow from the anarchy argu-
ment that we should retain our nuclear weapons because otherwise we
will not be able to achieve world dominance, or commit genocide on
populations that we dislike for reasons of racial prejudice. The argu-
ment that ends justify means is in theory a moral argument; and the
application of it also requires moral analysis, because it does not claim
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that all ends justify means. It only claims that legitimate ends justify
otherwise repugnant means.
The third way in which the anarchy argument relies on moral
premises is that it requires some examination of proportionality. The
ends must be legitimate, and one must morally accept the idea that
legitimate ends sometimes justify dubious means; but in addition, the
morally suspect aspects of the means must in some way be outweighed
by the desirability of the ends. It is desirable to put an end to human
rights abuses in China, but it is doubtful that we are entitled to do so
by incinerating the population of Syria in order to tangibly demonstrate
that we will take serious action to penalize human rights abusers. To
show that the ends justify the means in a particular case one must
show not only that ends sometimes justify means, and that the ends in
the particular case are legitimate, but also that in the particular case
the ends are important enough that we should set aside our moral
qualms about the means we must employ.
The anarchy argument, then, turns out not to be a morally skepti-
cal argument at all. What it really is, when understood in its most
plausible light, is a claim about the relationship between means and
ends. It is a claim that in those "anarchicai" situations where one can-
not depend on official governmental protection for one's legitimate
interests, one is entitled to take things into one's own hands, and to
employ means that would (in other circumstances) be morally imper-
missible. This is a moral claim, because it requires fIrst, a general
moral commitment to the principle that ends can sometimes justify
means; second, an assertion that the end in question is morally worthy;
and third, a specifIc belief that the end at issue in the particular case
justifIes the particular means chosen to pursue it.
We can now restate the problem that concerns us here about the
inability of international legal institutions to achieve corrective justice.
It is apparent to all, including the holders of corrective justice claims
and their supporters, that international institutions have no great capaci-
ty in this regard. It is not as though international law was generally
well-designed to achieve these goals, but simply failed to recognize
some particular c.laim as worthy of recompense. With holders of cor-
rective justice claims well aware that they can expect virtually nothing
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 645 1995-1996
1996] INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: PART II 645
from international law, they are faced with an unpleasant choice. Either
they can pursue the very limited avenues for redress that are legally
open to them (petitioning the General Assembly to take a position,
trying to file an action in the World Court, lobbying world opinion) or
they can take matters into their own hands (take to the streets, take to
the bush, or learn everything possible about plastic explosives).
It is easy to condemn such lawlessness when legal alternatives
exist; when there are centralized enforcement mechanisms that one has
an obligation to try to work through. Even where such mechanisms
exist, we are aware that they are not perfect; but in the better function-
ing domestic societies, most people gain enough from the fact that
these institutions possess a monopoly of force that it does not seem
unreasonable to condemn those who refuse to take society's word as
fmal.6 It is harder to condemn such "lawlessness" in a situation where
the existing legal institutions - whatever their virtues at other sorts of
functions - are generally acknowledged to be unable to provide effec-
tive redress for wrongs of this sort. It is not appropriate here to take a
position on the large issue of whether means in fact can be justified by
ends. I am deliberately limiting myself to the rather modest claim that
it is easy to see why those who feel they have a right to corrective
justice, that international institutions are endemically incapable of rec-
ognizing, fmd otherwise unpalatable methods within the bounds of the
acceptable. It is not possible to dismiss their arguments summarily. The
question of whether ends can ever justify means is a hard one that I
am unwilling here to address, whatever my own personal beliefs.
But what it should be easy to agree on is that these are moral
questions, even though the logic depends in important ways on the fact
that international relations is, in this respect, a state of partial anarchy.
Whether or not one agrees with the course of action that the
rightsholder undertakes, it is important in understanding the situation to
6. I limit my generalization to "better functioning societies" because in some societies
there are some groups that cannot be expected to work through legal channels, which have
been effectively foreclosed to them. Thus, for example, the situation of Jews in Nazi Ger-
many or blacks in apartheid South Africa is different from the usual case of a group that
simply has not been able to obtain what it wants through usual democratic channels or
through the processes of litigation.
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appreciate that :fl:om his or her own point of view, the person who
undertakes illegal violence is taking up a function that international law
has not fulfilled: provision of corrective justice.
IV. THEy:'RE BOTH RIGHT ... AND BOTH WRONG ...
If inability to supply corrective justice is the source of much of
today's international violence, and if those who feel they have justice
on their side are more successful for this reason, then one might ex-
pect the world's conflicts to be more one-sided than they are. Why is
it not the case that those who have justice on their side fight harder
and therefore win? Some conflicts are indeed one-sided in this respect;
some pit individuals who fight for justice against those who fight for
payor simply because they are told to and they must obey. Some
classic recent examples of this sort of one-sided conflict are the Viet-
nam War and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. These conflicts
were not one-sided overall, after one takes into account the superior
material resources of the United States and the Soviet Union, respec-
tively. It was precisely because of material superiority that the two
conflicts lasted as long as they did, for in both cases as soon as the
outside support disappeared, the game was over. But in terms of cor-
rective justice, the conflicts were distinctly asymmetrical. There seemed
to be an identifiable right and wrong side to the conflict, and the ma-
terial superiority of the wrong side eventually succumbed to the other
side's sense of commitment and belief in the justice of its cause.
It is interesting, though, how many conflicts do not fit this pattern
of a committed !,rt'oup fighting for what it sees as justice against a
group that is motivated by sheer realpolitik. Many conflicts around the
world are characterized by a strong sense of commitment and justice
on both sides. In part, of course, this reflects nothing more than the
simple fact that human beings often make mistakes of moral judgment,
especially when there is self-interest at stake. Both sides may think that
they are in the right, but one of them is likely to be wrong. But surely
there is something more than this at stake. If the moral issue is a close
one, then one might think that the individuals involved would be aware
of the issue's difficulty. They would not believe that their side was
clearly right, that if any reasonable person looked at the situation from
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an unbiased point of view, he or she would surely agree that their
cause was just. While it is possible that the explanation for both sides
simultaneously believing in the evident justice of their cause is nothing
more than self-delusion, an extra factor may be at work. That extra
factor has to do with international law's inability to provide corrective
justice.
The inability to provide corrective justice is not just a "one-time"
problem. It plagues the entire history of any given conflict as it un-
folds over time. Because at any given point in time the losing party
knows that it cannot turn to international law for help, that party turns
to extralegal methods instead. It feels entitled to do this, as a moral
matter, because it believes that its end is a legitimate and compelling
one and there is no other avenue of recourse. Whether or not it is
successful, its employment of extralegal methods now creates a griev-
ance on the part of the other side of the dispute. That side now feels
entitled to treat its opponents as lawbreakers, invaders or terrorists. In
its reprisals it believes that it is justified in using whatever means it
has at its disposal. The grievances accumulate over time, as one viola-
tion of moral and legal norms piles on top of another from both sides
of the dispute.
If one looks at only a short-term slice of the dispute, there does
seem to be a clear right and wrong. After the first wrong, it may be
relatively easy to pinpoint the violator. If one focuses on the point just
after a wrongful retaliation, taken out of context, the other side seems
clearly wrong. But it is a mistake to take things out of context this
way. The error that the participants make is typically more complicated
than simply overestimating the strength of their own claims of justice
(although often that is done as well). It is to focus on only those
points in history where they were the victims of extralegal or illegal
actions. In any protracted dispute, there is a substantial likelihood that
both sides will have grievances to point to that are genuine moral
wrongs. Each tends to overlook the grievances of the other side, and to
argue that the wrongs that they committed were nothing more than
reasonable reactions to their own suffering.
All too often, the problem develops in something similar to the
way that the problems have unfolded in the Balkans and the Middle
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East. Group A starts out in possession of a particular piece of territory,
and is then invaded by Group B which takes possession of a part or
all of the territory. Some time later, the A's manage to be successful
in regaining what they considered to be their historic homeland. A and
B, at this point, both believe themselves to have claims to corrective
justice; their territory was invaded and wrongfully taken from them.
The B's, at this point, are unable to retake "their" land militarily, so
they start a terror campaign in which they seek to frighten the A's into
relinquishing control. The A's respond with repression; it becomes
impossible for a citizen of Group B extraction to move freely or to
obtain a good job, and B's are subjected to humiliating searches and
questioning on the least provocation. Sometimes the B's are arbitrarily
jailed and beaten, or subjected to other forms of political discrimination
(such as being dIiven from their land). From the point of view of the
A's, they are responding to a terrorist movement mounted by a group
of people who never should have been living in their territory in the
fIrst place. From the B's point of view, innocent people are now being
subjected to human rights abuses and are therefore victims of guilt by
association. Furthermore, those "freedom fIghters" with whom the inno-
cent victims are being grouped are themselves behaving morally in
using whatever methods they can to right an historic injustice.
The reason that the two groups can both believe so sincerely (and,
in their own ternls, so plausibly) in the justice of their cause and in
the right to take the measures that they do is that they are working
from two completely different baselines. In the Balkans, for example,
the Serbs measure everything from a status quo ante of the early
BOOs, before the Turks invaded what is now Yugoslavia and converted
many of the inhabitants to Islam. But since then portions of the territo-
ry have changed hands many times, and every group that wants to
claim an "historic homeland" for its own need only fmd some time
period during which it occupied and governed that homeland, and then
insist that this is the appropriate place from which to mark depar-
tures.7 Furthermore, the Serbs can and do focus on the period of
7. For an illuminating and engaging account of the history of the Balkans, as seen
through the eyes of the participants in current struggles, see ROBERT KAPLAN, BALKAN
GHOSTS: A JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY (1993).
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Croatian domination during the Second World War, when many Serbi-
ans were massacred. The Bosnian Muslims in contrast focus on the
atrocities committed in the last few years.
In domestic law this problem also exists - we all know about the
Montagues and the Capulets, or the Hatfields and the McCoys - but
there are at least minimally acceptable devices for settling accounts, for
clearing the decks. These mechanisms are, essentially, the mechanisms
of corrective justice. It is the fact that international law is so self-evi-
dently incapable of imposing any corrective justice solutions that al-
lows grievances on both sides to accumulate. The fact that there are
grievances on both sides is what allows both sides to claim, plausibly,
that they are in the right and are entitled to do whatever they need to
in their efforts to prevail.
Ideally, moral theory would give us some guidance about how to
sort out this tangled pile of claims and counterclaims. If one side vio-
lates the other's rights, does this give the other the right to respond in
kind? There is far less that has usefully been said on this topic than on
many other moral problems, including topics of modem interest such
as wealth redistribution, promise keeping, human autonomy, and a long
list of others. But even less has been said about what to do about what
happens next. If the other does respond in kind, and if this was wrong-
ful, then what are we to do in a situation where apparently both par-
ties are in the wrong? If the other does respond, and this was permissi-
ble, then is it permissible for the fIrst to counterrespond? And what
statute of limitations (if any) applies? We simply do not have a moral
theory offering even tentative answers on most of these subjects.
The reason that both sides can believe strongly that they are in the
right is that we lack any well-developed and convincing theoretical
analyses - or even intuitions - about how such wrongs and rights
balance each other. Each side focuses simply on its "rights," and if it
is pointed out that the other side also has "rights" then it is a close
question which set of "rights" prevails. What is in fact a close moral
question appears so much more morally one-sided to the participants
because they are focusing on only a part of the problem, a single slice
of time. It is entirely possible that they might be clearly in the right
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with regard to 1he part of the problem that they are looking at, but
that there is no clear answer to the problem as a whole.
The inability of international institutions to provide corrective
justice, in sum, explains not only the existence of conflict but the
intensity of conflict. It explains the existence of conflict for the reason
that the aggrieved party fights because it believes that it has a good
claim and it knows that it has no international recourse. It explains the
intensity of conflict for the reason that as actions, reprisals and
counterreprisals accumulate, both sides come to have strongly held
beliefs that justiGe entitles them to what they want. And these beliefs
are sufficiently plausible that group leaders are able to recruit and hold
the allegiance of their followers, in spite of the all too obvious fact
that conflict is likely to end in destruction, suffering, and death.
v. THE ATTITUDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
One of the many disadvantages of the fact that the American pub-
lic tends to get ills sense of what is going on in the world from sourc-
es such as CNN is the inability of the popular media to present more
than a time slice of any particular problem. Perhaps this is because
television images are so static, so vivid when it comes to presenting
the "now," that the "now" swamps all awareness of what happened
"then." We have all heard criticisms of the way that the public did not
know or care about the suffering in Somalia until the television photo-
journalists put that country on the evening news. Famine coverage
generally arrives only when large numbers of people are already be-
yond the reach of help. But what is also true is that the thing that the
journalist in Somalia put on the evening news was, inevitably, the
news. It was pictures of what was going on at that exact time, albeit
in a place many 1housands of miles away. It gained its emotional force
from the very fact that it was happening at that very moment.
When we react to tragic events like these based on acquaintance-
ship of the moment, it is perhaps not surprising that we adopt the
perspective of the future. "Something bad is happening now; what can
be done to stop it?" we ask ourselves. We look for ways to get from
the status quo we fmd so terrible to something better for tomorrow.
The urgency of the desire, fueled by the images we see in photographs
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or on TV, makes measured academic consideration of how things came
to be this way seem laughably out of place, almost morally inappropri-
ate. The need to fix the problem is more morally compelling than the
need to analyze its roots.
This sense of urgent need to change things is coupled with implic-
it awareness of the fact that there are limited things that international
institutions can do to make the problem go away. For reasons I set out
in part one of this essay, the only tools that are ever-ready are those
of negotiation and diplomacy, with placing pressure on wrongdoers a
distinct second best and achievement of justice a distant third. When
we want to make things better, quickly, it is understandable that we
will tum to the tools we have at hand. In the case of famine relief, we
respond by sending food, often neglecting the underlying causes of
famine, such as civil war, maldistribution of income within a country,
or desertification. These would be hard to attack, and the strategy of
sending food (in contrast) is likely to offend no one.
As inadequate as this may be in the case of famine relief, it is far
more pathetic as a response to human conflict itself. When we see
pictures of civilian bomb victims in Sarajevo, or of a demolished bus
with its dismembered passengers in the West Bank, or scores of vic-
tims of a automatic rifle attack in a mosque in Hebron, a natural reac-
tion is "What can be done to stop the carnage?" The only readily
available answer is talking and compromise, but often the parties them-
selves show no interest in talking and compromise. Whether the eve-
ning news is about Belfast, Tuzla, or the Gaza strip, it seems natural
to shake one's head and wonder why those involved in such atrocities
are unable to see that everyone would be better off if the killing
stopped. Are they crazy?
If all one considers is improving one's lot in life, then they are.
By "improving one's lot in life" I do not mean only getting a better
income, or a bigger house, or being able to send one's children to
school, although these things are certainly included. I also mean the
nonmaterial advantages that follow from peace. These include the se-
cure companionship of loved ones who will not be dragged away to
fight; the ability to sleep at night without worry that a bomb will fall
nearby; and the knowledge that the house or farm one works each day
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to build for one's children will be enjoyed by them and not destroyed
by civil war or terrorism. In the majority of serious conflicts around
the world, the situation (both material and psychological) of all the
parties could be improved if they would only stop fighting. The inter-
national legal system strains mightily to arrange this for them. But in
many cases, they aren't interested.
This typically is because the people who actually fight the wars
and suffer their eonsequences compare proposed solutions to what they
feel entitled to, rather than to what they currently have. Their leaders
may be cynics, grasping for every advantage without regard to any
sentiment of justice, but those who fight and suffer typically believe, at
least they must if they hold out any hope of winning. When we watch
them suffering OIl CNN, we see their present but not the past that they
see. We see a future in which the suffering has stopped, but this is not
necessarily the future that they want to hold out for. Their unwilling-
ness to settle for a rational solution strikes us as crazy, and it drives us
crazy.
We fail, in short, to understand what the conflict means to the
people who participate in it. While we are all aware that the most
lasting peace is likely to be a just peace, this argument seems to us to
be too speculative and focused too far in the future to have much
importance when weighed against the devastation we see today and
hope to end tomorrow. There is also a more sinister side to our failure
of understanding. Continued fighting puts us at risk. The violence in
the Middle East has spillover effects in America. These have included
terrorist attacks on Americans abroad, hijacking of airliners on which
Americans were passengers, the bombing of the World Trade Center,
and other acts of violence and murder. It would be better for us if the
fighting stopped. This is not only because of our moral indignation
when we see its results in other countries on the television, but also
because of our fear of car bombers and airline hijackers in our midst.
Our desire to see the conflict over is typically manifested by our
expression of hope that the parties have sufficiently "exhausted them-
selves" by the fighting that they will be willing to talk seriously of
peace.8 It is clear that the parties' perceptions are largely subjective as
8. On the subjec;t of "exhaustion" in one particular context, see WILLIAM ZARlMAN,
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to whether the conflict is a zero sum problem of corrective justice or a
potentially positive sum problem in which settlement might make them
all better off. It all depends on how much positive value parties attach
to what they see as 'justice" and how much negative value they attach
to the idea of compromise. Conflict is most intractable where one or
both of the parties affIrmatively prefers to inflict pain on the other,
thereby guaranteeing that no solution will be mutually benefIcial. At
the point where the parties decide that they will never achieve their
preferred goal of corrective justice, and decide that they can live with
that fact, the compromises that the international community offer may
start to seem attractive. Sometimes they even come to see the positive
value of their opponents' positions, although that is often too much to
hope for.
With regard to the fIghting in the former Yugoslavia, we have
been waiting optimistically for several years now for the warring sides
to "exhaust themselves" and set to serious negotiations. Americans
generally are becoming familiar with a cliche well known to diplomats,
that you can't force peace on people who prefer to fIght. As I write
this, another peace plan is in the works, and it is indeed possible that
the Bosnian Serbs, the Croats, and the Bosnian Muslims are exhausted
enough to stop. Of course one must always be concerned that the lead-
ers who decide to step in line with international pressure to opt for the
Pareto optimal solution - the mutual improvement over the status quo
- will be cut off from popular support, outflanked by a more radical
leader who insists on holding out for justice. That of course has been
the position taken by Ramas, which fIlled the radical role vacated by
the P.L.O. But the international community is always waiting expec-
tantly for "nationalists," "terrorists," and "guerrilla fIghters" to fInally
decide to see things its way.
Many of my arguments are designed simply to suggest that such
nationalists, terrorists, and guerrilla fIghters are behaving perfectly
logically and consistently from their own point of view. They are re-
sponding to the inadequacies of the international legal system. One
does not have to be a wholehearted moral skeptic, or a proponent of
RIPE FOR REsOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA (2d ed. 1989).
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realpolitik, to recognize that there are some things at which the inter-
national legal system is not very good. One can believe in morality in
international rela1ions, and precisely because of that belief, understand
their actions in terms of something like anarchy. I believe that when
we try to step inside their point of view, we will have a better view of
what is going on. But there are also some more concrete suggestions
that I am prompted to make by this analysis.
The fIrst is to be willing to abandon, at least provisionally, the
false promise of neutrality. I don't mean to say that one should bring
one's own biases and interests to international conflicts. The problem,
instead, is with a peculiar way of being nonjudgmental. Although it
might seem neutral and open-minded, it is not necessarily an advantage
to approach problems with the attitude that both sides are equally right
and equally wrong; that each has its own subjective position but that
neither is better than the other.
I say that om~ must abandon neutrality provisionally because at the
same time that one recognizes that there are rights and wrongs in most
cases, one must n:~cognize that in any given case it is an open question
whether these rights and wrongs are more important than advancing the
competing goals of peace and prosperity. There may be circumstances
when it is necessary to adopt such a posture of neutrality, for instance
where some particular status' quo is so urgently bad that there is no
point asking who is to blame but only in trying to save human lives.
Relief groups are: sometimes in this position, as when they have to
decide whether to cooperate with morally repulsive governments to get
relief through, or whether to provide medical aid to all the wounded
(regardless of which side they fought on and whether they themselves
may have been guilty of human rights abuses).
But we should resist the temptation to adopt this posture out of
moral laziness, out of an unwillingness to make hard decisions about
who is right and who is wrong, or out of some displaced sense of
moral relativism that one has confused with impartiality. We should
avoid becoming so enmeshed in a technocratic "conflict management"
mentality that we fInd ourselves unable to understand that corrective
justice also means something, and that those who hold out for justice
are not necessarily acting out of emotion or self-interest. Conflict man-
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agement is an important objective - peace and prosperity are impor-
tant goals - but we must decide on a case-by-case basis how to bal-
ance it against the other aspirations international law must also have.
Second, we must be willing not only to make those decisions but
also to make them in an informed way. This means learning something
about the history of a conflict beyond what can be heard and seen on
CNN. It is all too easy to look at the results of conflict on the evening
news and blame it on terrorists or nationalist groups. This is just name
calling if it is not backed up by historically informed and well-rea-
soned moral judgment that takes into account what the group in ques-
tion had in mind when it did what it did. This recommendation is
addressed to the morally sensitive public rather than to international
affairs professionals, who certainly do not need to be told that conflict
can be neither understood nor managed without awareness of its histor-
ical foundation.
Finally, and most importantly (and, not coincidentally, of greatest
difficulty) we must pursue the development of institutions of corrective
justice at the international level.9 This is not a luxury that can be safe-
ly relegated by realists to fuzzy-minded moralists. I have tried to show
that the absence of corrective justice has a corrosive effect on the other
functions that international law is trying to fulfill. It interferes with the
ability to promote cooperation and peace, for the simple reason that
people care about justice and what it promises them as much as they
care about comparing where they stand now to where they might like
to stand tomorrow.
The international community has definitely made serious efforts in
this direction. One might think first of the World Court, but a more
interesting recent example might be the war crimes tribunals getting
underway in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. The Nuremberg
Trials were, obviously, another example. Various nations that have now
9. Note the role of domestic courts in adjudicating some of these problems, such as
the damage remedies for human rights violations provided by the federal Alien Tort Claims
Statute. On the role of American courts in the enforcement of international law, see general-
ly Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE
LJ. 2277 (1991); Harold Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347
(1991).
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Trials were, obviously, another example. Various nations that have now
thrown off military dictatorshipslo have considered trying past leaders
for human rights abuses. One must keep in mind the costs associated
with such endeavors, for there is no reason to assume that such investi-
gations can be undertaken without jeopardizing other goals. Sometimes
it may be better to "let bygones be bygones" . . . but not always. 11
VI. CONCLUSION
We sometimes look at foreign conflicts as though the men and
women who fight in them are from another planet. What can one pos-
sibly think of the Bosnian Serbs, the militant Islamic extremists, or the
LR.A., if one has no acquaintance with their view of history? They
seem so irrational, so atavistic, so mindless and peculiar. Any stranger
who did not und.erstand the conflicts in which we of the "advanced
Western nations" have fought, however, would take the same position
on viewing some of the devastation wrought by our "advanced" societ-
ies. What could have looked like a bigger waste of time (and human
life and resources) than the American Civil War ... from the point of
view of someone who did not understand what motivated it. We
understand the two World Wars in which our country figured from
their inner point of view. We should try to do the same for others'
conflicts. The goal is not to adopt their point of view, but to
understand it the better to be able to judge it.
To say that international law is stuck between its past and its
future is not to say that the past is necessarily more important than the
future or vice versa. That, probably, is a decision that will have to be
10. See Ryle, supra note 1, for a description of the ongoing trial in Ethiopia. For a
general discussion of the problem, see Diane. OrentIicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of Prior Regime, 100 YALE LJ. 2537 (1991).
11. It has of course been argued, historically speaking, that the agreement for repara-
tions after Versailles had the terribly negative effect of encouraging the development of
Nazism in Gennany during the interwar period. Similarly, it is possible that prosecution of
war criminals may havl: the undesired effect of making them less willing to stop fighting,
thus prolonging the conflict For a discussion of the difficulties attendant to such prosecu-
tions, see Carlos Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context:
The Case ofArgentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619 (1991); Diane OrentIicher, A Reply to Professor
Nino, 100 YALE LJ. 2641 (1991) (responding).
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made on a case-by-case basis. What seems deeply troubling, however,
is that, as things currently stand, the deck is systematically stacked.
Because of its paucity of institutional mechanisms, international law is
incapable of recognizing claims of justice and incapable of responding
to the needs of history. Given the great importance history has in shap-
ing the identities of individuals and of peoples, the systematic inability
to recognize its importance should be cause for concern even if that
inability did not upset attempts to structure the events of the future.
Such incapacity presupposes a rootlessness, an ability to always think
in terms of where one is going from here, that is out of touch with the
way most people live their lives and want to live their lives. When one
adds the practical consequences of the inability to respond to claims of
justice - the instability and violence that can result - then the costs
are clearly higher.
History, and corrective justice, deserve a higher priority on the
international agenda. As our international legal system matures over
time, we have to hope that in this (as in other ways) it will come to
be increasingly satisfactory.
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